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Abstract: We examine whether and how retirement affects migration decisions in 
China. Using a regression discontinuity (RD) design approach combined with a 
nationally representative sample of 228,855 adults aged between 40 and 75, we find 
that retirement increases the probability of migration by 12.9 percentage points. 
Approximately 38% of the total migration effects can be attributed to inter-temporal 
substitution (delayed migration). Retirement-induced migrants are lower-educated and 
have restricted access to social security. Household-level migration decisions can 
reconcile different migration responses across gender. Retirees migrate for risk sharing 
and family protection mechnisms, reducing market production of their families in the 
receiving households. 
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1 Introduction  
Due to strong reductions in fertility in the past, the economic challenges posed by 
population aging are particularly high in China. Approximately one-third of its 
population will be aged 60 and above in 2050 (UN Population Division, 2017 Revision), 
leading to more retirees and a shrinking workforce. While the statutory retirement age 
officially introduced in 1978 has not changed since then, China intends to progressively 
increase it in the future. This may have a profound impact on social and economic 
outcomes because retirement is a significant life event that is associated with decreasing 
income, increasing leisure time, and potentially changes in access to health care (Zhang, 
Salm, and van Soest 2018). For example, the prominent phenomenon that consumption 
expenditures drop sharply upon retirement, militating against the theory of consumption 
smoothing and known as the retirement consumption puzzle, has been examined by 
various studies over the past decades (Banks, Blundell, and Tanner 1998; Battistin et al. 
2009; Luengo-Prado and Sevilla 2012; Li, Shi, and Wu 2015) . However, there is still 
scant scientific evidence on how retirement affects other older adult’s behaviors that 
can lead to profound social and economic changes. 
 
One potential behavioral change after retirement is migration. A long-standing theory 
considers migration as investment in human capital, which is costly but improves job 
opportunities (Schultz 1961; Sjaastad 1962; Bowles 1970). A number of studies reveal 
that a positive income shock facilitates migration by easing liquidity constraints (Bryan, 
Chowdhury, and Mobarak 2014; Angelucci 2015; Cai 2018). According to this line of 
argument we should witness a falling propensity to migrate when people exit the labor 
market upon retirement and therefore experience a reduction in income.5 However, 
                                                             
5 This is consistent with the old Chinese saying that falling leaves return to their roots.  
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recent studies also show that people may resort to migration as risk-sharing or shock 
coping strategies (Rosenzweig and Stark 1989; Gröger and Zylberberg 2016; Munshi 
and Rosenzweig 2016; Morten 2019). For example, when older people demand more 
health services upon retirement, and if public health services are inadequate, they may 
migrate for the reason of obtaining informal healthcare from their family members.6 
As a result, the impact of retirement on the propensity to migrate is uncertain from a 
theoretical point of view and pins down to an empirical question that we aim to answer 
in this article.   
 
Understanding whether retirement will cause a higher geographic mobility of older 
adults is important for the following reasons. First, internal migration of older cohorts 
may lead to considerable demographic, social, cultural, and economic changes as the 
number of older adults increase over decades (Bean et al. 1994; Deller 1995). For 
example, it may have a negative impact on the financial stability of local social security 
systems through lower tax revenues and higher dependency ratios (Razin, Sadka, and 
Swagel 2002a, 2002b). It may also cause labor supply shocks in the receiving 
households/regions through reallocation of working time from market production to 
home production (Stancanelli and Van Soest 2012; Li, Shi, and Wu 2015). Second, high 
migration may lead to provincial-level heterogeneity in rates of population aging (Frey 
1995; Rogerson 1996), which can have consequences for regional economic growth 
and income convergence between provinces (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992). Third, 
knowing the pattern of later-life migration provides the scientific foundation for 
                                                             
6 Another reason could be that people move from areas with high living costs to areas with low living costs 
after retirement. Using housing costs as a proxy for living costs, we do not find evidence that average housing costs 
change significantly upon retirement (more details can be found in the appendix). 
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designing aging-related policies in the domains of retirement, regional infrastructure, 
healthcare, and long-term care. Finally, it is plausible that the migration behavior of 
older adults may be heterogeneous among subgroups defined by gender and educational 
attainment. Taking account of this variation may help policymakers in designing 
suitable policies for subgroups and thereby improve the health and well-being of the 
older population altogether. 
 
While late-life migration has been addressed in earlier frameworks such as the 
lifecourse model (Rossi 1955; Walters 2002), most of them have methodological 
constraints and suffer from endogeneity issues (Bradley et al. 2008; Longino Jr et al. 
2008; Sander and Bell 2014). Previous studies focus on the association between 
retirement and migration rather than on causality. However, workers who want to 
migrate for other reasons – e.g., because they experience declining health or the death 
of a spouse – are also more likely to retire. This raises problems related to reverse 
causality and implies the need for an accurate identification strategy. Furthermore, most 
of the previous studies use comparatively small datasets. 
 
To address endogeneity issues, we use a regression discontinuity (RD) design to 
estimate the causal effect of retirement on migration in China. The focus on China 
implies three crucial advantages: i) it allows us to utilize a unique large-scale nationally 
representative population-based dataset of a 20% random sample of the China 
Population Census survey in 2005. The resulting sample accounts for 0.2% of the total 
population in China, which corresponds to 2.6 million people in all 31 provinces. 
Among other variables, the dataset includes information on age, gender, education level, 
marital status, self-reported health, retirement status, social security participation such 
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as medical insurance and pension, migration status, and income. We keep those 
individuals aged between 40 and 75 years who have never quit the labor force before 
retirement, which amounts to a sample of 228,855 adults; ii) our RD framework exploits 
that the probability of retiring increases discontinuously at the statutory retirement age 
in China (i.e., 60 for males, 50 for female workers, and 55 for female civil servants). 
These thresholds are induced by mandatory retirement rules, which were officially 
established in 1978 and have not changed since then. The mandatory retirement rules 
are strictly enforced for urban workers (especially in public sectors) but less so for rural 
residents such as farmers or those who are self-employed. This is ideal for conducting 
a placebo test on the sample of the rural population; iii) the Chinese institutional setting 
offers an important advantage over studies focusing on other countries such as the 
United States, where individuals become eligible for the Medicare insurance program 
once they pass the age threshold of 65. It is therefore hard to disentangle the effects of 
retirement from those of Medicare insurance such that studies using the threshold of 
age 65 as an instrument for retirement (Insler 2014; Neuman 2008) run the risk of 
confounding their results with the effects of Medicare eligibility. This problem is 
avoided when focusing on China because it has a universal healthcare system, in which 
more than 95% of its population are insured via the Urban Employee Medical Insurance 
(UEMI) or the Urban Residence Medical Insurance (URMI) for urban residents, or via 
the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) for rural residents. Retirees continue 
to enroll in their healthcare plans. Thus, the estimated effect of retirement will not be 
confounded by changes in health insurance.  
 
To our best knowledge, this is the first study that estimates the causal effect of 
retirement on migration behavior under a RD framework, using a large-scale nationally 
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representative population-based dataset. By exploring the heterogeneity in the effect of 
retirement across sub-groups (e.g., by gender, education groups, etc.), we expect that 
this study will elucidate the potential underlying mechanisms and thereby provide a 
scientific foundation for economic policies that address the challenges and 
opportunities induced by the migration of retirees.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we illustrate the institutional 
backgrounds of retirement policy and migration settings in China. In Section 3 we 
present the data and summary statistics. Section 4 contains our main results and various 
robustness and sensitivity analyses. In Section 5 we explore the heterogeneity in the 
effect of retirement across different sub-groups of the population. In Section 6 we 
discuss the potential causal mechanisms from retirement to migration in older adults. 
Finally, in Section 7 we summarize and draw our conclusions. 
 
2 Institutional details 
2.1 Statutory retirement ages in China 
The current statutory retirement ages in China have been formally established on May 
24th, 1978 when the retirement policy was approved at the Second Meeting of the 
Standing Committee of the Fifth National People’s Congress. Policy-relevant 
documents include “The State Councils’ Provisional Measures for Taking Care of the 
Aged, Physically Weak, Sick and Disabled Cadres” and “The State Council’s 
Provisional Measures Concerning the Retirement and Resignation of Workers”. 
According to the retirement policy, the general statutory retirement ages for men and 
women are 60 and 50, respectively. For female civil servants, the statutory retirement 
age is 55. The statutory retirement policy is more strictly enforced in urban areas, 
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particularly for workers of the public sector. By contrast, workers in rural areas (e.g., 
farmers, workers who are self-employed, etc.) are more flexible to choose the timing of 
retirement. The mandatory retirement policy in urban China allows us to better cope 
with the causal impact of retirement. Thus, we restrict our analysis to urban residents 
and use the rural sample for placebo tests.   
 
2.2 Migration policy in China 
To regulate internal migration, China established the Hukou System in 1958. According 
to the Hukou System, everyone is born with a specific Hukou registered at his or her 
birthplace. Urban residents hold a non-agricultural Hukou, while rural residents hold an 
agricultural Hukou. Having a non-agricultural Hukou allows one to access local social 
welfare (e.g., medical insurance, pension, etc.), whereas agricultural Hukou holders 
have little access to social protection.7 More importantly, migrants who are moving to 
an unregistered place cannot enjoy local social welfare as natives. In other words, social 
welfare is non-portable along with migration (Dong 2009; Q. Meng et al. 2015). For 
example, migrants who are covered by medical insurance in a registered place cannot 
enjoy the same healthcare services in another unregistered place. They have to pay more 
to obtain local public services such as medical care. Nevertheless, China witnessed 
unprecedented internal migration of the working age population regardless of the 
restrictive migration policy.8 Additionally, due to limited access to local public services 
at the destination, these young migrants used to stay temporarily and return back home 
much earlier than the statutory retirement ages (X. Meng 2012; X. Meng, Xue, and Xue 
                                                             
7 More details on the Hukou System can be found in Chan and Zhang (1999) and Chan and Buckingham (2008). 
8 According to the Population census in 2010, the total number of internal migrants was 261 million, which is 
about 81% higher than the number in 2000.  
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2016). Figure A1 in the appendix shows the relationship between age and the migration 
rate. We find that the average migration rate decreases gradually with increasing age 
for the working population, particularly for the working population from rural areas. 
By contrast, we find evidence that the average migration rate rebounds after retirement, 
particularly for the population from urban areas. Most of the economic studies on 
migration behavior are concerned with the younger working age population, and little 
is known on the migration behavior of retirees, who are getting more and more 
important.  
 
3 Data and summary statistics   
3.1 Data source 
Our data comprises a 20% random sample of the China Population Census survey in 
2005, which accounts for 0.2% of the total population in China. The sample covers 
about 2.6 million people in all 31 provinces and equivalent administrative units of 
mainland China. The survey includes variables such as income, age, gender, education 
level, Hukou type, marital status, self-reported health, retirement status, migration 
status, and social security participation such as medical insurance and pension. Unique 
information on health and income imply that the census survey in 2005 is particularly 
valuable in our context as compared with census surveys in alternative years. See Xie 
and Zhou (2014) for more details of this dataset. Although there are alternative survey 
datasets such as RUMiC that can identify migrants, migrants included in these surveys 
are mostly from rural China and are therefore not as strongly affected by the mandatory 
retirement policy. By contrast, the census survey allows us to identify both migrants 
from rural and urban China.  
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3.2 Retirement definition and eligible sample 
We keep those urban residents aged between 40 and 75 years who have never quit the 
labor force before retirement. Specifically, we use the following two questions in the 
questionnaire to determine retirement: First, did you engage in paid work in the past 
week? Second, why did you have no paid work? We define people as retired if they: 1) 
did not engage in paid work in the past week; and 2) self-reported retired. We drop 
observations for the following alternative reasons of having no paid work: i) being a 
student, ii) seeking no paid work voluntarily, and iii) being unemployed to allow for a 
precise comparison between workers and retirees.9 Given that some retirees continue 
working after formal retirement, we resort to a third question in the questionnaire for 
an alternative way of defining retirement: what is your main source of living 
expenditures? According to this question, we define people as retired if they resort to 
pension payments as their main source for financing their living expenses. We use this 
alternative definition of retirement to perform a robustness check. The final sample 
consists of 228,855 individuals, of whom 133,422 are men and 95,433 are women.  
 
According to the data, the average retirement rate of the whole sample is 42%, with 11% 
for the sample below the statutory retirement age and 87% for the remaining sample. 
Figure 1 shows the retirement rate by age and gender for urban residents. We observe 
that the retirement rate jumps significantly at ages 50 and 60 for women and men, 
respectively. For women, the retirement rate also increases slightly at age 55 but much 
less so than at age 50, which is consistent with the fact that civil servants account only 
for a small proportion of the female workforce (Zhang, Salm, and van Soest 2018). 
                                                             
9 We also conduct robustness checks by including these observations as non-retirees and our main results are 
still robust. 
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Since our data do not contain detailed information about civil servants and other public 
sector employees, we proxy the statutory retirement age to age 50 for all women.  
[Figure 1] 
 
Figure 1 Retirement rate by age and gender  
Notes: The general statutory retirement ages for men and women are 60 and 50, respectively. For 
female civil servants, the statutory retirement age is 55. Note that we only keep urban residents in 
the sample because the statutory retirement policy is more strictly enforced in urban areas, while 
rural residents have more flexibility to choose the timing of retirement.     
 
To merge the different statutory retirement ages for men and women into one single 
variable, we construct the normalized age, which is equal to the actual age minus the 
retirement age. Thus, the normalized age variable equals zero for men and women at 
the respective statutory retirement age. Figure 2 shows that at the normalized age (i.e., 
the statutory retirement age for both men and women), the average retirement rate 
jumps from 44% to 68%, suggesting that there is a significant increase in the retirement 
rate immediately after reaching the statutory retirement age.  
[Figure 2] 
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Figure 2 Retirement rate and normalized age 
Notes: The normalized age equals to the actual age minus the statutory retirement age. We define 
people as retired if they: 1) did not engage in paid work in the past week; 2) self-reported as retired. 
Note that we drop observations for alternative reasons of having no paid work such as being a 
student, seeking no paid work voluntarily, and being unemployed to allow for a precise comparison 
between workers and retirees. The bin is selected based on the IMSE-optimal evenly-spaced method 
of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014b.   
 
3.3 Migration definition 
We define a migrant as an individual who has lived away from his or her registered 
place.10 Specifically, we use the following question in the questionnaire to determine 
migration: what is your current Hukou registration status? We define people as migrants 
if they did not live in their Hukou registered place. We also use an alternative definition 
of migration by excluding individuals who have lived away from their registered place 
but for less than 6 months for a robustness check. Specifically, we use an additional 
question in the questionnaire to determine migration duration: how long have you lived 
away from your Hukou registered place? Based on the answers, we define people as 
                                                             
10 Due to data limitations, we cannot identify permanent migrants who changed their registered place. Since 
permanent migration was still very restrictive in 2005, we assume that the registered place is typically the same as 
the place of birth.   
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migrants if they (1) did not live in their Hukou registered place; 2) lived away from 
their Hukou registered place for more than 6 months. While the second definition of 
migration is consistent with the official definition of internal migration in China, it 
ignores the recent migrants who have just moved away from their registered place.  
 
According to the data, the average migration rate is 17%, i.e., the percentage of the 
population that is classified as migrants is 17% in our sample. Different from previous 
studies that focus on migrants from rural China, more than 92% of migrants in our study 
come from urban China. This is consistent with the fact that the statutory retirement 
policy mainly applies to the urban population. We also find that the average migration 
rate is 17% in the sample below the statutory retirement age and 16% in the remaining 
sample, which is consistent with previous studies showing that the migration rate is 
negatively related to age (Zhao 1999). Figure 3 shows that at the statutory retirement 
age, the average migration rate increases from 16% to 18%, suggesting that there is a 
significant increase in the migration rate immediately after reaching the statutory 
retirement age. More details on the data description can be found in Tables A1-A2 in 
the appendix. 
[Figure 3] 
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Figure 3 Urban migration rate and normalized age  
Notes: we define people as migrants if they did not live in their Hukou registered place. Note that 
this definition of migration is a bit different from the official definition of migration in China, the 
latter of which excludes people who have lived away from their Hukou registered place for less than 
6 months. The bin is selected based on the IMSE-optimal evenly-spaced method of Calonico, 
Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014b.  
 
4 Assessing the causal effects of retirement on migration 
4.1 Simple regression model 
Our aim is to estimate the causal effect of retirement on migration decisions, or the 
probability of moving away from one’s registered place. To this end, we start with a 
Linear Probability Model:  
 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖′Β + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, (1) 
 
where 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 is the migration status of individual i, which is equal to one for a migrant 
and zero otherwise, 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 is the dummy variable for the retirement decision, and τ is the 
causal effect of retirement on the outcome variable. The vector 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖′  contains 
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predetermined variables such as gender, age polynomials11, education, marital status 
and ethnicity. Since retirement decisions might be endogenous to the propensity to 
migrate, the OLS estimates are biased which is the reason for following an RD design. 
 
4.2 Regression discontinuity design 
To address the potential endogeneity of retirement decisions, we use a nonparametric 
fuzzy RD design. The RD design exploits the statutory retirement age as a source of 
exogenous variation in retirement decisions (Battistin et al. 2009; Li, Shi, and Wu 2015; 
Heller-Sahlgren 2017; Fitzpatrick and Moore 2018).  
 
The treatment effect can be estimated as the ratio of the jump in the probability of 
migration M and the jump in the probability of retirement at the statutory retirement 
age, as shown in Eq. (2) 
 
𝜏𝜏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = lim𝜀𝜀↓0 𝐸𝐸[𝑀𝑀|𝑎𝑎=0+𝜀𝜀]−lim𝜀𝜀↑0 𝐸𝐸[𝑀𝑀|𝑎𝑎=0−𝜀𝜀]lim
𝜀𝜀↓0
𝐸𝐸[𝐹𝐹|𝑎𝑎=0+𝜀𝜀]−lim
𝜀𝜀↑0
𝐸𝐸[𝐹𝐹|𝑎𝑎=0−𝜀𝜀] . (2) 
 
Here a is the normalized age, i.e., the actual age minus the retirement age and 𝜏𝜏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
is the local average treatment effect on compliers at the threshold point. In our context, 
it is the average change in the probability of migration for those who are induced to 
retire as a result of the statutory retirement age. 
 
To estimate the parameter 𝜏𝜏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 , we choose nonparametric estimation to avoid 
                                                             
11 We use quadratic and cubic polynomials because there is still an ongoing debate on the correct polynomial 
order to be included (Lee and Lemieux 2010; Gelman and Imbens 2018). 
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assuming a particular functional form of the assignment variable. We use the triangular 
kernel function to construct the local-polynomial estimators and use a data driven 
method to choose the bandwidth of the kernel function based on one common MSE-
optimal bandwidth selector method (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014). 
 
With age as the running variable, assignment to treatment is inevitable as all individuals 
would eventually reach retirement age (age 60 for men and age 50 for women in this 
case). This gives rise to an “anticipation effect” which means that individuals who 
anticipate the change may behave in a certain way before treatment is provided (Lee 
and Lemieux 2010). In particular, older adults may delay migration until after 
retirement, which may accentuate the size of the discontinuity. A common practice to 
address this problem is to conduct a donut-hole RD to reduce this concern (Barreca et 
al. 2011; Shigeoka 2014). 
 
4.3 Validity tests 
A valid fuzzy RD design relies on two main assumptions in our context. The first 
assumption requires a discontinuity in the probability of retirement at the threshold 
point. Figure 2 shows that the retirement rate increases significantly (by about 20 
percentage points) at the statutory retirement ages for urban residents. As expected, 
there is no jump of the retirement rate at the threshold for rural residents (Figure A2). 
These results are consistent with the fact that the statutory retirement ages mainly apply 
to urban residents. 
 
The second assumption requires continuity in potential outcomes as a function of the 
assignment variable around the threshold. This implies that in the absence of retirement, 
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the probability of migration should not change at the threshold. In other words, “all 
other factors” driving migration must be continuous at the threshold point. Following 
Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we conduct several tests to check this assumption. First, 
we test the hypothesis that all covariates are continuous at the statutory retirement ages. 
Second, we test whether there is a discontinuity in the density of the assignment variable 
using the manipulation test proposed by Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2018). All the test 
results justify the validity of the RD design. Details on these test results can be found 
in the appendix.  
 
4.4 Main results  
We start with OLS estimation using different model specifications. However, since OLS 
estimates are likely to be biased, we only report the results in the appendix. We find that 
the coefficient of retirement is close to zero, i. e., the OLS estimates do not reveal a 
significant relationship between retirement and migration. To address endogeneity 
concerns and isolate the causal effect of retirement, we next apply the described fuzzy 
RD design and report the results in Table 1. Columns 1 and 2 show the RD estimates 
using the optimal bandwidth. We find that the migration probability increases 
significantly after retirement. According to the bias-corrected RD estimates, retirement 
increases the probability of migration by 12.9 percentage points. Column 2 presents 
additional results by including covariates such as education and ethnicity. Including 
covariates is not necessary for unbiased inference under the assumptions of an RD 
design. However, adding covariates to the estimation is useful for: 1) eliminating small 
sample imbalances in observed variables that are correlated with the threshold; and 2) 
improving the precision of the causal RD estimates. Our main results are still robust 
when including covariates.  
18 
 
 
Columns 3-5 use alternative bandwidths to address concerns that data-driven criteria 
for an optimal choice of the bandwidth might be suboptimal or cannot be applied for 
categorical outcomes (Xu 2017). Taking 50%, 75%, 125%, and 150% of the bandwidth 
used in the benchmark model, we still find consistent evidence that retirement 
encourages migration. In addition, we find that the standard errors become larger when 
using smaller bandwidths, suggesting a bias-variance trade-off when selecting 
bandwidths. Reassuringly, the results of an alternative instrumental variable approach 
(see below) are consistent with the results based on the RD design. 
[Table 1] 
Table 1 Causal impact of retirement on migration decisions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Conventional 0.116 0.115 0.140 0.117 0.104 0.089 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.055) (0.041) (0.028) (0.026) 
Robust 0.129 0.129 0.165 0.143 0.132 0.134 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.080) (0.060) (0.042) (0.038) 
Bandwidth  
Covariates  
4.6 
NO 
4.6 
YES 
2.3 
YES 
3.4 
YES 
5.7 
YES 
6.9 
YES 
Observations 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 
Notes: This table shows the impact of retirement on migration decisions using the RD design. 
Conventional outcomes refer to RD estimates with conventional variance estimator. Robust 
outcomes refer to RD estimates with robust variance estimator (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 
2014b, 2014a). Column 1 reports the baseline model results. Column 2 reports the RD estimates by 
controlling for covariates such as education, ethnicity and marriage status. Columns 1-2 select the 
bandwidth based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth selector (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014b). 
Columns 3-6 take 50%, 75%, 125% and 150% of the optimal bandwidth, respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
 
As we discussed earlier, there is a potential bias in estimating the impact of retirement 
on migration decisions, largely due to the “anticipation effect”. To partially account for 
this effect, we run a donut-hole RD by excluding a few months of observations around 
the threshold (Barreca, Lindo, and Waddell 2016). There is no guideline for choosing 
the size of the “donut-hole” statistically or economically because it is often not clear 
what magnitude of delay is reasonable to expect. Thus, we first experiment with small 
“donut-hole” sizes ranging from zero to six months. As is shown in Table 2, the RD 
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estimates are qualitatively unchanged though larger standard errors are observed as the 
donut-hole expands. When further increasing the size of the “donut-hole”, shown in 
Figure 4, we find evidence that the point estimates are relatively stable up to 23 months. 
However, when the size of the “donut-hole” reaches 24 months and above, we find a 
reduction of the point estimates towards zero, likely due to the fact that too many 
observations (about 40% of the bandwidth) are excluded which will “undermine the 
virtue of the RD design” (Shigeoka 2014). Nonetheless, the “donut-hole” results show 
that the RD estimates are not sensitive to the “anticipation effect”, which makes it 
unlikely that the increased migration after retirement can be attributed solely to the 
“anticipation effect”. 
[Table 2]  
Table 2 Estimates from the donut-hole RD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Conventional 0.099 0.108 0.108 0.100 0.088 0.088 0.105 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.063) (0.063) (0.082) 
Robust 0.110 0.120 0.120 0.112 0.086 0.086 0.100 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.077) (0.077) (0.100) 
Size of Donut- 
hole 
zero 
month 
one 
month 
two 
months 
three 
months 
four 
months  
five 
months 
six 
months  
Observations 228,073 226,853 226,853 224,536 223,399 223,399 221,296 
Notes: This table shows the estimates from the donut-hole RD design by excluding observations 
around the threshold. Column 1 shows estimates by removing observations at the threshold, or the 
statutory retirement age. Column 2 shows estimates by removing observations of one month around 
the threshold from either side of the statutory retirement age. Columns 3-7 each show the estimates 
by removing one more month around the threshold from either side of the statutory retirement age. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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[Figure 4] 
 
Figure 4 Donut-holes approach  
Notes: The “donut-hole” sizes range from 0 to 26 months. The markers show the point estimates 
using different “donut-hole” sizes. Confidence spikes are reported for 99% and 95% confidence 
intervals. The vertical dash line refers to an average treatment effect of 10 percentage points. 
 
Given the fact that the donut-hole RD approach does not rule out the possibility that 
there is some degree of inter-temporal substitution of migration, or “delayed migration” 
in our context, the extent to which we can interpret the local average treatment effect 
as the net effect of retirement is a priori uncertain. While the donut-hole RD estimate 
strengthens the causal interpretation of the average treatment effect, it cannot be used 
to decompose the overall treatment effect into the part of migration that is caused by 
inter-temporal substitution and the net effect of retirement on migration.  
 
To decompose the overall effect by assessing the importance of inter-temporal 
substitution of migration, we resort to a bunching approach. In so doing, we follow 
Ehrlich and Seidel (2018) and compare the observed migration rate over the normalized 
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age to a counterfactual distribution calculated as if there was no statutory retirement. 
This allows us to infer the extent to which people delay migration when approaching 
retirement. 
 
We follow the conventional method, compute the migration rate over normalized age, 
assign observations to evenly spaced bins (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2015), and 
depict the local averages by bin against the distance from the treatment threshold. 
Figure 5 illustrates the idea, where the dots represent the observed migration rate in 
each bin. The dashed curve depicts the counterfactual distribution of the migration rate 
obtained by fitting a flexible polynomial to the observed distribution, excluding 
observations within a range of 24 months around the statutory retirement age, and 
extrapolating the fitted distribution. 12  We also fit the distribution of the observed 
migration rate on both side of the statutory retirement age separately as represented by 
the solid curves. 
 
Two insights can be derived from this analysis. First, the intersections of the solid and 
dashed curves provide an estimate of the overall time horizon for migration reallocation. 
From Figure 5, we can see that reallocation starts approximately 2 years prior to the 
statutory retirement age and reaches to approximately 4 years after the statutory 
retirement age, implying reallocation happens over a period of approximately 6 years. 
Second, the difference between the observed and the counterfactual distributions (areas 
between the dashed and solid lines) provides us with an estimate of the associated mass 
of reallocated migration (Ehrlich and Seidel, 2018). We find that the missing mass on 
                                                             
12 Results with an even larger range (e.g. 4 years) are very similar and are presented as robustness checks in 
the appendix.  
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the left side of the statutory retirement age accounts for approximately 38% (with 90% 
confidence interval between 36% and 42%) of the additional mass on the right side of 
the statutory retirement age. We interpret these results as evidence for substantial inter-
temporal substitution of migration. That being said, the net migration effect of 
retirement is still dominant and accounts for 62% of the migration effects.  
[Figure 5] 
 
Figure 5 Bunching approach: average urban migration rate over normalized age 
Notes: Observations are assigned to equally sized bins, where the dots illustrate local averages of 
the urban migration rate within bins. The bin is selected based on the IMSE-optimal evenly-spaced 
method of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014b. The dashed line illustrates the estimated 
counterfactual distribution. The solid lines represent flexible polynomials fitted separately on both 
sides of the treatment threshold. Note that we drop observations in a range of 2 years around the 
treatment threshold to draw the counterfactual distribution of the urban migration rate.   
 
4.5 Robustness checks  
To further assess the robustness of our results, we considered the following changes. 
First, following Lee and Card (2008), we use standard errors clustered by the running 
variable to check whether our results are robust when allowing for a discrete running 
variable. We report the estimation results in Table 3. We do not find substantial changes, 
suggesting that our main results are robust even for a discrete running variable. Second, 
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we use an instrumental variable approach to estimate the impact of retirement on 
migration decisions. We restrict the final sample based on the benchmark bandwidth 
and construct the instrumental variable based on whether an individual is eligible for 
retirement. The IV estimation results are shown in Table 4. We find that retirement 
increases the probability of migration by 11 percentage points, which is consistent using 
different model specifications. Therefore, our main results are robust with respect to the 
estimation approach adopted. Finally, we conduct two different placebo regressions. 
The first uses different placebo age thresholds, before and after the statutory retirement 
ages (shown in Table 5a). The second uses the sample of the rural population that is not 
affected by the statutory retirement ages (shown in Table 6a). Unsurprisingly, we do not 
find significant effects of retirement on migration decisions using both placebo analyses, 
further strengthening our main results that retirement is indeed an important causal 
driver of migration decisions. Given the fact that the denominator of the discontinuity 
estimand is nearly zero, making the point estimates largely imprecise, we also check 
the potential discontinuity at the artificial cut-offs without diving by the change in the 
probability of retirement (the reduced form), and our results are generally robust 
(Results are shown in Tables 5b and 6b. 
[Tables 3-6] 
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Table 3 Impact of retirement on migration decisions by considering discrete running variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Conventional 0.115 0.115 0.140 0.117 0.104 0.089 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.060) (0.044) (0.031) (0.028) 
Robust 0.129 0.129 0.165 0.143 0.132 0.134 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.079) (0.061) (0.044) (0.040) 
Bandwidth  
Covariates  
4.6 
NO 
4.6 
YES 
2.3 
YES 
3.4 
YES 
5.7 
YES 
6.9 
YES 
Observations 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 
Notes: This table shows the impact of retirement on migration decisions using the RD design by 
considering the risks caused by a discrete running variable (Lee and Card 2008). Column 1 reports 
the baseline model results. Column 2 reports the RD estimates by controlling for covariates such as 
education and ethnicity. Columns 1-2 select the bandwidth based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth 
selector (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014b). Columns 3-6 take 50%, 75%, 125% and 150% 
of optimal bandwidth, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by the age variable and are reported 
in parentheses. 
 
Table 4 Impact of Retirement on migration decisions using the IV approach 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 IV IV IV 
Retirement 0.114 0.116 0.113 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
Observations 63823 63823 63823 
Notes: This table shows the impact of retirement on migration decisions using the IV approach. The 
instrumental variable takes the value 1 when the normalized age is equal to zero and above, and 
takes the value 0 otherwise. Column 1 controls for variables such as age, gender, education, ethnicity, 
and marriage status. Column 2 further controls for 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2 and Column 3 further controls for 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴3. 
Samples are restricted based on the benchmark bandwidth (-4.6 to 4.6). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
Table 5a Impact of retirement on migration decisions using alternative age cut-offs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Conventional -2.896 -0.039 0.249 -0.279 -0.369 -0.049 
 (5.915) (0.087) (0.437) (0.443) (0.257) (0.158) 
Robust 3.525 -0.055 0.195 -0.082 -0.302 -0.037 
 (6.368) (0.096) (0.506) (0.472) (0.273) (0.171) 
Age cut-offs -0.5 0.5 -1 1 -2 2 
Observations 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 
Notes: This table conducts placebo analyses using alternative age cut-offs to estimate the impact of 
retirement on migration decisions. The age cut-off for the benchmark model is 0. Columns 1 and 2 
use -0.5 and 0.5 to conduct placebo analyses, Columns 3 and 4 use -1 and 1 to conduct placebo 
analyses, and Columns 5 and 6 use -2 and 2 to conduct placebo analyses. We select the bandwidth 
based on one common MSE-optimal bandwidth selector. Covariates are excluded. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
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Table 5b Reduced form results using alternative age cut-offs (reduced form results) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Conventional 0.019 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Robust 0.021 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
Age cut-offs -0.5 0.5 -1 1 -2 2 
Observations 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 
Notes: This table conducts placebo analyses on reduced form results using alternative age cut-offs. 
The age cut-off for the benchmark model is 0. Columns 1 and 2 use -0.5 and 0.5 to conduct placebo 
analyses, Columns 3 and 4 use -1 and 1 to conduct placebo analyses, and Columns 5 and 6 use -2 
and 2 to conduct placebo analyses. We select the bandwidth based on one common MSE-optimal 
bandwidth selector. Covariates are excluded. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 6a Impact of retirement on migration decisions using the rural samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Conventional 1.178 1.025 -9.944 3.409 0.392 0.112 
 (3.694) (2.651) (76.294) (12.075) (1.385) (0.583) 
Robust 2.270 1.870 20.520 17.626 1.891 0.293 
 (4.145) (3.019) (116.338) (17.902) (2.023) (0.855) 
Bandwidth  
Covariates  
2.4 
NO 
2.4 
YES 
1.2 
YES 
1.8 
YES 
3.1 
YES 
5 
YES 
Observations 493,640 493,640 493,640 493,640 493,640 493,640 
Notes: This table conducts the placebo analyses in the sample of rural people to estimate the impact 
of retirement on migration decisions using the RD design. Columns 1-2 select the bandwidth based 
on one common MSE-optimal bandwidth selector. Column 1 reports the benchmark model results. 
Column 2 reports the RD estimates by controlling for covariates such as education and ethnicity. 
Columns 3-6 take 50%, 75%, 125% and 150% of benchmark bandwidth, respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 6b Reduced reform results using the rural samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Conventional 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Robust 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Bandwidth  
Covariates  
2.4 
NO 
2.4 
YES 
1.2 
YES 
1.8 
YES 
3.1 
YES 
5 
YES 
Observations 493,640 493,640 493,640 493,640 493,640 493,640 
Notes: This table conducts the placebo analyses on the reduced form results using the sample of 
rural people. Columns 1-2 select the bandwidth based on one common MSE-optimal bandwidth 
selector. Column 1 reports the benchmark model results. Column 2 reports the RD estimates by 
controlling for covariates such as education and ethnicity. Columns 3-6 take 50%, 75%, 125% and 
150% of benchmark bandwidth, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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5 Who is more likely to migrate after retirement? 
5.1 Subgroups  
We have shown that retirement increases migration significantly. This section explores 
further who is more likely to migrate after retirement. Specifically, we investigate the 
impact of retirement on migration decisions by gender, education groups, whether the 
individual has access to social security, and the type of registered place. The education 
level is categorized as low (highest degree achieved includes primary school, junior 
high school, and senior high school), or high (highest degree achieved includes 
vocational school, “two-/three-year college/associate degree”, “four-year 
undergraduate/bachelor degree”, master degree, or doctoral degree). In addition, we use 
the following questions to determine access to social security: “do you have medical 
insurance?” and “do you have pension?” If an individual answers with “yes” to either 
one of these questions, s/he will be categorized as having access to social security. 
Finally, we use the following question to determine the type of registered place: “what’s 
your type of registered place?” If an individual answers with urban (rural), s/he will be 
a migrant registered in urban (rural) areas. 
 
5.2 Main Results  
Table 7 shows the results by subgroups. We find that the causal effects of retirement on 
migration vary significantly across gender. First, while retirement increases the 
probability of migration for men by 27 percentage points (Column 1), the increase is 
much smaller for women (Column 2). Second, retirement has a large and significant 
effect for the low-educated group, yet only a moderate and insignificant effect for the 
high-educated group (Columns 3 and 4) suggesting that migration after retirement 
mainly occurs among lower-educated people. Third, retirement has a larger effect on 
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migration for people who do not have access to social security than for those who do 
(Columns 5-8). Specifically, retirement leads to an increase of 39 percentage points in 
the probability of migration for individuals with no access to pension. By contrast, we 
find a much smaller impact of retirement on the migration probability when retirees 
have access to pension. Finally, we find retirement results in a significant increase in 
the migration probability for individuals who are registered in urban areas (Column 9). 
We do not find significant evidence that retirement results in more migration from rural 
areas (Column 10). To summarize, retirement-induced migrants are mainly from urban 
areas, they are typically less well educated, and they are more likely to suffer from 
restricted access to social security. 
[Table 7] 
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Table 7 Heterogeneous effects of retirement on migration 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Male  
(2) 
Female  
(3) 
College  
(4) 
No College 
(5) 
Pension 
(6) 
No Pension 
(7) 
Medical Insurance  
(8) 
No Medical 
Insurance 
Conventional 0.242 0.075 0.050 0.134 0.079 0.346 0.086 0.218 
 (0.110) (0.041) (0.101) (0.036) (0.033) (0.136) (0.033) (0.077) 
Robust 0.277 0.073 0.050 0.150 0.093 0.395 0.098 0.248 
 (0.127) (0.049) (0.123) (0.040) (0.039) (0.156) (0.038) (0.085) 
Observations 133,422 95,433 43,470 185,385 166,779 62,076 166,990 61,865 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)  
VARIABLES Urban migration Rural  
migration 
Labor 
migration 
Family 
migration 
Other 
migration 
Household 
migration 
Individual migration  
Conventional 0.108 0.008 0.003 0.101 0.002 0.160 0.015  
 (0.030) (0.009) (0.015) (0.025) (0.013) (0.072) (0.038)  
Robust 0.119 0.011 0.007 0.110 0.001 0.190 0.004  
 (0.034) (0.010) (0.016) (0.029) (0.016) (0.080) (0.046)  
Observations 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 152,004 152,004  
Notes: This table shows the causal effects of retirement on migration by subgroups using the RD design. Conventional outcomes refer to RD estimates with conventional 
variance estimator. Robust outcomes refer to RD estimates with robust variance estimator (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014b, 2014a). Columns 1 and 2 report 
the effects of retirement on migration for men and women, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the effects of retirement on migration for individuals with and without 
college degree (and above). Columns 5 and 6 report the effects of retirement on migration for individuals with and without pension. Columns 7 and 8 report the effects 
of retirement on migration for individuals with and without medical insurance. Column 9 reports the impact of retirement on migration from urban areas. Column 10 
reports the impact of retirement on migration from rural areas. Column 11 reports the impact of retirement on work relevant migration. Column 12 reports the impact 
of retirement on family relevant migration. Column 13 reports the impact of retirement on other migration. Column 14 reports the impact of retirement on migration 
with partner. Column 15 reports the impact of retirement on migration without partner. We select the bandwidth based on MSE-optimal bandwidth selector. Covariates 
are excluded. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
29 
 
6 Why does migration rebound after retirement? 
As we have discussed above, urban vulnerable people (e.g., the less well educated with 
restricted access to social security) are more likely to choose migration after retirement. 
However, it is still unclear why migration rebounds after retirement, a pattern we can 
see clearly in Figure A1 in the appendix. In particular, it is puzzling that men’s 
migration decisions are more responsive to retirement as compared with women.  
 
To shed more light on this, we investigate the migration motives after retirement in 
more detail. We resort to the following question in the questionnaire to define migration 
motives: why did you live away from your registered place? In general, there are three 
types of migrants categorized by migration motives: labor migrants, family migrants, 
and other migrants. We define labor migrants as individuals who migrate for work-
related reasons (e.g., people migrate to another place to find a job). We define family 
migrants as individuals who migrate for family-related reasons (e.g., people migrate to 
another place to live with their children, spouse, relatives, etc.). When an individual 
migrates for neither work-related reasons nor family-related reasons, s/he is categorized 
as other migrant. We investigate which type of migration is actually induced by 
retirement. Table 7 shows the corresponding RD results. We find that retirement 
encourages migration for family-related reasons significantly (Column 11). By contrast, 
we do not find significant evidence that retirement affects migration for work-related 
reasons (Column 12) and for other reasons (Column 13). Therefore, retirement 
migration is largely driven by family-related motivations.  
 
So why does migration rebound after retirement? One motivation for migration comes 
from the consideration of future incomes. For example, reductions in income and rising 
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income uncertainty after retirement may encourage people to migrate to get better 
financial support from other family members or to reduce living expenses. Table 8 
shows the RD estimates on the impact of retirement on income-related outcomes. The 
results show that both income and working time decrease strongly after retirement 
(Columns 1-6). We also find that retirement leads to a higher dependence on pension as 
the main source of living expenses (Columns 7-9). Moreover, we have shown before 
that the retirement impact on migration is larger for individuals with no access to 
pension. Therefore, these findings suggest that retirees migrate to insure against 
reductions in income after retirement.  
[Table 8] 
 
An alternative motivation is that people migrate to insure against their rising health 
risks after retirement. Existing studies suggest that retirement increases healthcare 
utilization in China (Zhang, Salm, and van Soest 2018). In the presence of inadequate 
public healthcare, people may resort to their family members for informal healthcare, 
particularly when retirement increases their demand for healthcare. This is consistent 
with our previous findings that vulnerable people who have limited access to public 
healthcare services are more likely to migrate upon retirement. To make these 
arguments more convincing, we explore the impact of retirement on self-reported health 
further, as shown in Table 8.13 We find that retirement deteriorates health significantly 
(Columns 10-12). Specifically, retirement leads to a 0.11 unit change in heath on a 1-3 
scale. The results are robust against using an alternative health indicator (Columns 13-
                                                             
13 The indicator of self-reported health takes the value of one for people in good health, the value of two for 
people with fair health, and the value of three for people with bad health.  
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15)14 and the large health impact of retirement for men is consistent with previous 
findings (Lei, Tan, and Zhao 2011; Fitzpatrick and Moore 2018). Therefore, these 
findings suggest that increasing health risks after retirement induce retirees to migrate 
to live with their families.  
 
While both reductions in income and increased health risks may partly explain the 
rebounding migration after retirement, it is still puzzling why retirement migration is 
stronger for men than for women. One possibility is that retirement results in larger 
reductions in income and higher health risks for men relative to women. While a larger 
negative health impact of retirement is indeed found for men relative to women 
(Columns 10-15), we failed to find significant differences in the impacts of retirement 
on income and the main sources of living expenses across gender (Columns 1-9). 
Therefore, the heterogeneous income and health impacts of retirement across gender 
cannot fully explain the larger migration impact of retirement for men.  
 
An alternative explanation is that migration decisions of older individuals are made at 
the household level. With the large gap between retirement ages for men and women, 
even though a woman has reached her retirement age, her husband may not have 
reached his retirement age, and as a result, she may choose to wait to migrate until her 
husband can retire and migrate as well. To verify this argument, we restrict our sample 
to individuals who can be matched with their partners. To increase the sample size, we 
also include individuals who did not engage in paid work for reasons such as being 
                                                             
14 When using an alternative indicator of good health, which equals to one for good health and zero otherwise, 
we find retirement decreases the probability of good health by 20 and 4 percentage points for men and women, 
respectively.  
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students, being unemployed, and other reasons. Our final sample size is 152,004. To 
examine the impact of retirement on migration decisions at the household level, we also 
redefine the retirement age as the one of the spouse with the later retirement date. We 
define household-level migration as the situation in which both partners migrate and 
individual-level migration as the situation in which one partner is left behind. The main 
results are reported in Columns 14-15 of Table 7. We find that retirement results in a 
significant 19 percentage points increase in the migration probability at the household 
level. By contrast, we do not find a significant impact of retirement on the migration 
propensity at the individual level. Therefore, the various migration responses after 
retirement across gender can be reconciled by migration decisions being made at the 
household level rather than at the individual level.  
 
Finally, we test a competing explanation that retirees may migrate to the receiving 
households (e.g. their children’s households) to support their families (e.g. looking after 
grandchildren etc.). The main hypothesis here is that labor supply of the receving 
households would increase if retirees migrate to support their families, due to re-
allocation of working time from home production to market production. By contrast, 
we should witness decreasing labor supply of workers in the receiving households if 
retirees’ migration decisions are driven by risk sharing and family protection 
mechanisms because families in the receiving households will take more time for home 
production (e.g. look after the older adults).  
 
We restrict our sample to individuasl who can be matched with their children or 
children-in-law. The final sample size is 133,914. We resort to two indicators for our 
main analyses: the labor market participation decision and working hours per week. 
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The main results are reported in Table 9. We find that parental retirement does not have 
any significant impact on the labor market participation decision of their children (-in-
law). However, parental retirement significantly decreases (weekly) working hours of 
their children (-in-law) in the labor market. Specifically, parental retirement decreases 
working hours of their children (-in-law) by 16%. We also find a larger impact of 
parental retirement on labor supply of daughters (-in-law), suggesting that daughters (-
in-law) may take on more responsibilities related to care for older adults which is 
consistent with social norms in China. All these results strengthen our argument that 
retirees migrate for risk sharing and family protection rather than to support their 
families such as looking after grandchildren.    
[Table 9] 
 
Overall, reductions in future incomes and increased health risks are two possible 
explanations for rebounding migration after retirement. The heterogeneous retirement 
effects on migration across gender can be well reconciled with the household-level 
migration decisions after retirement. To summarize, unlike labor migration, which is 
usually related to income motives among people from rural China, retirement-induced 
migration seems to take place predominantly among people from urban China to insure 
against both reductions in income and increased health risks, at the expense of reducing 
market production of their families in the receiving households. 
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Table 8 Impact of retirement on other outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Income Male Female Working 
Hours  
Male Female Pension as main 
sources of living  
Male Female 
Conventional -6.769 -7.149 -6.678 -3.631 -3.628 -3.656 1.061 1.121 1.016 
 (0.056) (0.181) (0.092) (0.030) (0.132) (0.064) (0.015) (0.049) (0.021) 
Robust -6.800 -7.145 -6.725 -3.632 -3.634 -3.657 1.058 1.135 1.009 
 (0.068) (0.198) (0.105) (0.036) (0.145) (0.069) (0.018) (0.059) (0.023) 
Observations 228,855 133,422 95,433 228,855 133,422 95,433 228,855 133,422 95,433 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)    
VARIABLES  Self-report Health Male Female Good Health  Male Female    
Conventional 0.105 0.253 0.040 -0.079 -0.195 -0.036    
 (0.034) (0.123) (0.020) (0.022) (0.102) (0.023)    
Robust 0.115 0.263 0.049 -0.092 -0.206 -0.041    
 (0.038) (0.136) (0.024) (0.027) (0.112) (0.026)    
Observations 228,855 133,422 95,433 228,855 133,422 95,433    
Notes: This table shows the impact of retirement on other outcomes using the RD design. Conventional outcomes refer to RD estimates with conventional variance 
estimator. Robust outcomes refer to RD estimates with robust variance estimator (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014b, 2014a). Columns 1-3 report the impact of 
retirement on income in log using full, male only, and female only sample, respectively. Columns 4-6 report the impact of retirement on working hours in log using 
full, male only, and female only sample. Columns 7-9 report the impact of retirement on the probability of resorting to pension as main sources of living expenditures 
using full, male only, and female only sample. Columns 10-12 report the impact of retirement on self-reported health using full, male only, and female only sample. 
Columns 13-15 report the impact of retirement on the probability of having a good health using full, male only, and female only sample. We select the bandwidth based 
on MSE-optimal bandwidth selector. Covariates are excluded. Standard errors are in parentheses 
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Table 9 Impact of parental retirement on children (in-law)’s labor market outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Parental 
migration 
decisions 
Labor market 
participation 
decision 
Weekly  
working hours 
Son (in-law)’s weekly 
working hours  
Daughter (-in-law)’s weekly 
working hours 
Conventional 0.144 0.031 -0.151 -0.139 -0.169 
 (0.045) (0.059) (0.067) (0.085) (0.114) 
Robust 0.162 0.007 -0.166 -0.133 -0.223 
 (0.048) (0.071) (0.075) (0.103) (0.137) 
Observations 133,914 133,914 57,033 30,932 26,101 
Notes: This table shows the impact of parental retirement on children’s labor market outcomes using the RD design. We use the same Census Survey data to conduct 
this analysis by restricting our samples to individuals who can be matched with their children (-in-law). Column 1 uses the restricted sample to estimate the impact of 
retirement on individuals’ migration decisions. Column 2 shows the impact of retirement on children (in-law)’s labor market participation decision. Column 3 shows 
the impact of retirement on children (-in-law)’s weekly working hours. Column 4 shows the impact of retirement on son (in-law)’s weekly working hours. Column 4 
shows the impact of retirement on daughter (in-law)’s weekly working hours. We select the bandwidth based on MSE-optimal bandwidth selector. Covariates are 
excluded. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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7 Conclusion 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the causal effects of 
retirement on migration decisions in China and in other low- and middle-income 
countries. In contrast to labor migration that decreases with increasing age, our findings 
suggest that the migration probability increases significantly upon retirement, 
especially for men. We also find that approximately 38% of the total migration effects 
are caused by intertemporal substitution (delayed migration). More importantly, the 
rebounding migration is dominated by vulnerable people who are less well educated 
and have less access to social security. While both reductions in future income and 
increasing health risks are possible explanations for rebounding migration after 
retirement, it is the household-level migration decision that can reconcile the various 
migration responses to retirement across gender. Unlike labor migration that is related 
predominantly to income motives among people from rural China, retirement-induced 
migration seems to take place among people from urban China to insure against both 
income and health shocks through better access to financial and healthcare support from 
family members.  
 
Our finding that migration rebounds after retirement contrasts with the conventional 
wisdom that the migration propensity decreases as people get older. An important 
lesson to be taken from our study is that retirees are coping with reductions in future 
income and increased health risks through migration because migration increases their 
access to financial and healthcare support from family members, particularly when 
access to social security such as pension and healthcare are restricted. In addition, our 
study sheds light on the important interactions between retirement and migration 
policies, which have been largely ignored in the literature. According to our findings, 
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restrictive migration policies would deteriorate the welfare of retirees, particularly for 
the vulnerable. By contrast, lower migration costs improve the welfare of retirees 
through better access to informal financial support and healthcare provided by family 
members, which is complementary to social security in coping with income and health 
risks upon retirement. Finally, our study sheds light on the labor market consequences 
of retirement-induced migration on receiving households. According to our findings, 
parental retirement significantly reduces market production of their children (-in-law) 
in the receiving households by 16%, even more so for daughters (-in-law). In other 
words, retirement-induced migration also acts as an important channel to impact labor 
supply decisions of the young population (Börsch-Supan 2013). 
 
There are several limitations of this study. First, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
migration affects health, which may weaken the mechanisms discussed above. For 
example, when there is poor portability of social security such as medical insurance, 
migrants are subject to higher medical costs at the destination. These higher medical 
costs discourage healthcare utilization and in turn affect migrants’ health negatively. 
These effects tend to be relatively large for migrants who have been previously covered 
by medical insurance in the origin region. However, we think that this issue is less 
problematic in our context because migration effects after retirement are more 
pronounced for those vulnerable people who have no access to social security to begin 
with. Second, we cannot simply extend our findings to rural China, which witnesses a 
more prominent internal migration but is hardly affected by the mandatory retirement 
policy. 
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Appendix  
 
A1. Additional figures   
 
 
Figure A1 Age and migration rate by cohorts 
 
 
Figure A2 Retirement and age for rural people 
Notes: The bin is selected based on IMSE-optimal evenly-spaced method based on (Calonico, 
Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014b). 
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Figure A3 Retirement and migration for rural people 
Notes: The bin is selected based on IMSE-optimal evenly-spaced method based on (Calonico, 
Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014b). 
 
 
Figure A4 Bunching approach: average migration rate over normalized age 
Notes: Observations are assigned to equally sized bins, where the dots illustrate local averages of 
the migration rate within bins. The bin is selected based on the IMSE-optimal evenly-spaced method 
of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014b. The dashed line illustrates the estimated counterfactual 
distribution. The solid lines represent flexible polynomials fitted separately on both sides of the 
treatment threshold. Note that we drop observations in a range of 4 years around the treatment 
threshold to draw the counterfactual distribution of the migration rate. 
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A2. Summary Statistics  
 
Table A1 Summary Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES N mean min max 
Age 228,855.00 53.46 40.00 75.00 
Normalized Age 228,855.00 -2.37 -20.00 25.00 
Retirement(=0,1) 228,855.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 
[0]Not retired 228,855.00 0.58 0.00 1.00 
[1]Retired 228,855.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Self-report health(=1,2,3,4) 228,855.00 1.10 1.00 4.00 
[1]Good health 228,855.00 0.91 0.00 1.00 
[2]Fair 228,855.00 0.08 0.00 1.00 
[3]Bad 228,855.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 
[4]Uncertain 228,855.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Male(=0,1) 228,855.00 0.58 0.00 1.00 
[0]Female 228,855.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 
[1]Male 228,855.00 0.58 0.00 1.00 
Education Degree(=1,2,3,4,5,6,7) 228,855.00 3.54 1.00 7.00 
[1]No school 228,855.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 
[2]Primary school 228,855.00 0.15 0.00 1.00 
[3]Junior high school 228,855.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 
[4]Senior high school 228,855.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 
[5]Two-/three-year college/associate degree 228,855.00 0.12 0.00 1.00 
[6]Undergraduate 228,855.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
[7]Master and above 228,855.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Marriage Status(=1,2,3,4,5) 228,855.00 2.20 1.00 5.00 
[1]Single 228,855.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 
[2]Married 228,855.00 0.89 0.00 1.00 
[3]Remarried 228,855.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 
[4]Divorced 228,855.00 0.02 0.00 1.00 
[5]Widowed 228,855.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Medical Insurance(=0,1) 228,855.00 0.73 0.00 1.00 
[0]No Medical Insurance 228,855.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 
[1]With Medical Insurance 228,855.00 0.73 0.00 1.00 
Pension(=0,1) 228,855.00 0.73 0.00 1.00 
[0]No Pension 228,855.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 
[1]With pension 228,855.00 0.73 0.00 1.00 
Migrant(=0,1) 228,855.00 0.17 0.00 1.00 
[0]Non-migrant 228,855.00 0.83 0.00 1.00 
[1]Migrant 228,855.00 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Notes: Normalized age=age-60 for men and Normalized age=age-50 for women 
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Table A2 Summary statistics around the cut-off 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 -1<=age<0 0<=age<1 
VARIABLES N mean N mean 
Age 6,555.00 53.93 7,503.00 54.68 
Normalized Age 6,555.00 -0.55 7,503.00 0.45 
Retirement(=0,1) 6,555.00 0.44 7,503.00 0.68 
[0]Not retired 6,555.00 0.56 7,503.00 0.32 
[1]Retired 6,555.00 0.44 7,503.00 0.68 
Self-report health(=1,2,3,4) 6,555.00 1.06 7,503.00 1.09 
[1]Good health 6,555.00 0.94 7,503.00 0.92 
[2]Fair 6,555.00 0.05 7,503.00 0.07 
[3]Bad 6,555.00 0.00 7,503.00 0.01 
[4]Uncertain 6,555.00 0.00 7,503.00 0.00 
Male(=0,1) 6,555.00 0.45 7,503.00 0.42 
[0]Female 6,555.00 0.55 7,503.00 0.58 
[1]Male 6,555.00 0.45 7,503.00 0.42 
Education Degree(=1,2,3,4,5,6,7) 6,555.00 3.51 7,503.00 3.43 
[1]No school 6,555.00 0.02 7,503.00 0.02 
[2]Primary school 6,555.00 0.16 7,503.00 0.16 
[3]Junior high school 6,555.00 0.35 7,503.00 0.40 
[4]Senior high school 6,555.00 0.31 7,503.00 0.27 
[5]Two-/three-year college/associate degree 6,555.00 0.11 7,503.00 0.10 
[6]Undergraduate 6,555.00 0.05 7,503.00 0.05 
[7]Master and above 6,555.00 0.00 7,503.00 0.00 
Marriage Status(=1,2,3,4,5) 6,555.00 2.16 7,503.00 2.17 
[1]Single 6,555.00 0.01 7,503.00 0.01 
[2]Married 6,555.00 0.91 7,503.00 0.90 
[3]Remarried 6,555.00 0.03 7,503.00 0.04 
[4]Divorced 6,555.00 0.02 7,503.00 0.02 
[5]Widowed 6,555.00 0.03 7,503.00 0.03 
Medical Insurance(=0,1) 6,555.00 0.73 7,503.00 0.76 
[0]No Medical Insurance 6,555.00 0.27 7,503.00 0.24 
[1]With Medical Insurance 6,555.00 0.73 7,503.00 0.76 
Pension(=0,1) 6,555.00 0.73 7,503.00 0.76 
[0]No Pension 6,555.00 0.27 7,503.00 0.24 
[1]With pension 6,555.00 0.73 7,503.00 0.76 
Migrant(=0,1) 6,555.00 0.16 7,503.00 0.18 
[0]Non-migrant 6,555.00 0.84 7,503.00 0.82 
[1]Migrant 6,555.00 0.16 7,503.00 0.18 
Notes: Normalized age=age-60 for men and Normalized age=age-50 for women 
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A3. Alternative estimation results  
 
Table A3 Impact of Retirement on migration decisions using the regression approach 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit Logit 
Retirement -0.009 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 228855 228855 228855 228855 228855 228855 228855 
Notes: This table estimates the impact of retirement on migration using different regression models. 
Column 1 shows the OLS estimate without control variables. Column 2 controls for age variables. 
Column 3 controls for quadratic polynomials of age. Column 4 controls for cubic polynomials of 
age. Column 5 further controls for other individual characteristics such as gender, education, 
ethnicity, and marriage status. Column 5 uses a Probit model and Column 6 uses a Logit model, 
with all variables controlled for. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
A4. Validity tests  
A4.1 Continuity tests  
 
Table A4 Continuity tests for covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Primary Non-primary Han Non-Han Married  Unmarried  
Conventional 0.004 0.005 -0.000 -0.009 -0.004 0.003 
 (0.036) (0.032) (0.029) (0.024) (0.018) (0.018) 
Robust 0.016 -0.009 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 0.003 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.031) (0.028) (0.022) (0.022) 
Bandwidth  Data 
driven  
Data  
driven 
Data 
driven 
Data 
driven 
Data 
driven 
Data driven 
Observations 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 
Notes: This table shows continuity tests for covariates. Primary refers to people who did not attend 
junior high school and above. Non-primary refers to people who attended junior high school or 
above. Han refers to people with ethnicity of Han. Married refers to people in a marriage. Unmarried 
refers to people who are single, divorced or widowed. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
A4.2 Manipulation tests  
 
We conduct the manipulation tests using the STATA command rddensity proposed by Cattaneo et 
al. (2018). The p-value of the final manipulation test is 0.3755. Therefore, there is no statistical 
evidence of systematic manipulation of the running variable.  
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A5. Retirement and housing arrangements  
 
Table A5 Retirement and housing arrangements 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Conventional 0.001 0.016 0.064 
 (0.031) (0.118) (0.187) 
Robust 0.004 -0.015 0.056 
 (0.035) (0.140) (0.205) 
Observations 228,855 136,585 31,350 
Notes: This table shows the impact of retirement on housing arrangements. We distinguish between 
people with house ownership and without house ownership (e.g. rent). Column 1 shows the impact 
of retirement on the probability of living in a house with ownership. Column 2 shows the impact of 
retirement on the costs of purchasing the house among people with house ownership. Column 3 
shows the impact of retirement on the costs of renting the house among people without house 
ownership. Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
 
A6. Alternative definition of retirement  
 
Table A6 Causal impact of retirement on migration decisions using an alternative definition of 
retirement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Conventional 0.116 0.115 0.140 0.117 0.104 0.089 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.055) (0.041) (0.028) (0.026) 
Conventional 0.109 0.109 0.134 0.110 0.098 0.083 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.053) (0.039) (0.027) (0.024) 
Bandwidth  
Covariates  
4.6 
NO 
4.6 
YES 
2.3 
YES 
3.4 
YES 
5.7 
YES 
6.9 
YES 
Observations 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 228,855 
Notes: This table shows the impact of retirement on migration decisions using an alternative 
definition of retirement. We redefine retirees as individuals who resort to pension as the main source 
of living expenditures. Conventional outcomes refer to RD estimates with conventional variance 
estimator. Robust outcomes refer to RD estimates with robust variance estimator (Calonico, 
Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014b, 2014a). Column 1 reports the baseline model results. Column 2 
reports the RD estimates by controlling for covariates such as education, ethnicity and marriage 
status. Columns 1-2 select the bandwidth based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth selector (Calonico, 
Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014b). Columns 3-6 take 50%, 75%, 125% and 150% of optimal bandwidth, 
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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A7. Alternative definition of migration  
 
Table A7 Causal impact of retirement on migration decisions using an alternative definition of 
migration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Conventional 0.108 0.107 0.125 0.106 0.098 0.084 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.055) (0.041) (0.028) (0.026) 
Robust 0.119 0.119 0.148 0.127 0.119 0.123 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.081) (0.060) (0.042) (0.038) 
Bandwidth  
Covariates  
4.6 
NO 
4.6 
YES 
2.3 
YES 
3.4 
YES 
5.7 
YES 
6.9 
YES 
Observations 227,931 227,931 227,931 227,931 227,931 227,931 
Notes: This table shows the impact of retirement on migration decisions using an alternative 
definition of migration. We redefine migrants as individuals who have lived away from their 
registered place for more than 6 months. Conventional outcomes refer to RD estimates with 
conventional variance estimator. Robust outcomes refer to RD estimates with robust variance 
estimator (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014b, 2014a). Column 1 reports the baseline model 
results. Column 2 reports the RD estimates by controlling for covariates such as education, ethnicity 
and marriage status. Columns 1-2 select the bandwidth based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth 
selector (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014b). Columns 3-6 take 50%, 75%, 125% and 150% 
of optimal bandwidth, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
A8. Alternative range selection for bunching approach  
 
In the main analysis, we fit a flexible polynomial to the observed distribution, excluding 
observations in a range of 2 years around the treatment threshold, and extrapolate the fitted 
distribution. We use an alternative range of 4 years around the treatment threshold to conduct 
robustness checks and find that approximately 36% of total migration effects are due to inter-
temporal substitution (delayed migration), with the 90 percent confidence interval for the missing 
mass ranging between 34% and 42%. 
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